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NEGOTIATING THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH COURT 
ORDERS: AN INITIAL EXPLORATION* 
NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO** 
Judicial review of federal agencies rests on the premise that if a 
court gives an order to an agency, the agency will obey. Yet the 
federal government’s compliance with court orders is far from 
automatic, especially with orders telling an agency to act 
affirmatively, which may strain limited agency resources, 
interfere with the agency’s other legally required tasks, or force 
the agency to act on deficient information. An agency may 
invoke these difficulties to convince a judge that it should be cut 
more slack—that is, given more latitude (especially more time) to 
comply. Judges often find the agency’s difficulties to be quite real 
and hold back from demanding strict and rapid compliance. 
Thus, whether an agency must actually do what a court has 
ordered, and on what terms, entails a delicate negotiation 
between agency, judge, and plaintiff. These compliance 
negotiations, despite their great practical importance, are little 
analyzed or understood in the academic literature, for it is 
difficult to learn about them through traditional sources like 
appellate case law. This Essay, drawing upon a large cache of 
dockets from district court cases in which compliance troubles 
arose, provides an initial exploration of this unexplored subject. 
This Essay finds that the central problem in these cases is the 
judge’s access (or lack of access) to information about why the 
agency is falling short and whether it could do more. On this 
theme, this Essay discusses (1) the kind of information that an 
agency can provide about its own internal management so as to 
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convince the judge that it is trying hard enough to comply; (2) the 
imperfect and even crude methods that judges use to discern 
whether an agency is trying hard enough; and (3) the ways in 
which judges can employ information-gathering techniques, such 
as requiring testimony by high agency officials, as quasi 
sanctions to force the agency to pay more attention to what the 
court has ordered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law as a field focuses mainly on judicial review of 
agency action. Such review rests on the premise that if a court gives 
an order to an agency, the agency will obey. Yet the federal 
government’s compliance with court orders is far from automatic. 
Compliance can become a problem when a court holds agency action 
unlawful and sets it aside, for example, when district judges found 
that the Obama Administration disobeyed injunctions against 
prohibiting offshore oil drilling1 and against shielding aliens from 
deportation.2 But compliance problems are even more common when 
the challenge is to agency inaction, that is, when the court is telling 
the agency to act affirmatively—something we see not uncommonly 
in areas like environmental law, natural resource management, and 
freedom of information. When a judicial order tells an agency to act 
affirmatively, it can strain limited agency funding and personnel, 
 
 1. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar, No. 10-1663, 2011 WL 454802, at *3 
(E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), rev’d, 713 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 2. Order at 1–2, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00254 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2015), 
ECF No. 281. 
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disrupt the agency’s ordering of its priorities (potentially interfering 
with other tasks the agency is legally required to carry out), or force 
the agency to act on technical or scientific knowledge that is deficient. 
There is substantial literature on how a court, in deciding 
whether to issue an order compelling agency action in the first place, 
should anticipate and weigh these problems,3 but the decision to issue 
such an order is often just the beginning of the story. The court, 
exercising its equitable discretion, has to decide the terms of the 
injunction. Should it simply order the required action all in one piece, 
letting the agency decide the details, or should it break the action into 
steps and order them individually, effectively micromanaging the 
agency? Should the court attach deadlines to the action, to the steps 
that constitute the action, or both, or should it instead trust the 
agency to get everything done in a more or less “reasonable” time? 
And there’s more: even when the order spells out specifics and is 
sharpened by deadlines, agencies have been known to come back to 
court asking for extensions, warning that, unless the judge cuts the 
agency some slack, the action will be rushed and therefore 
dangerously ill-conceived or the agency’s other tasks will be 
dangerously neglected. A judge must then ask herself: does the 
bureaucracy really deserve more latitude on this, or am I being 
suckered into excusing the agency’s incompetence, or worse, its 
political aversion to doing what the law requires?4 Thus, a plaintiff 
may “win” a suit to compel agency action only to find that victory 
opens up a fraught and complex negotiation over the terms and 
timing of obedience that may go on for years. 
We know far too little about how these compliance negotiations 
work. Despite their significance for the efficacy of judicial review, 
 
 3. This literature includes Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in 
Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2008); Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: 
Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 
(2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923 (2008); Michael D. 
Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial 
and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381 
(2011); Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369 (2009); 
and Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer 
Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157 (2014). 
 4. For commentary on the legitimate role of a judge’s equitable discretion in 
deciding the terms and timing on which federal agencies must carry out statutorily 
required actions, see the classic statement in Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 711–14 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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there is very little academic literature on them.5 A major reason for 
this inattention, I believe, is that while compliance negotiations are 
bound by doctrine in certain ways, there is not a doctrine of 
compliance negotiations per se. To learn about these negotiations, 
one cannot rely mainly on traditional sources like appellate case law. 
The negotiations are a matter of case management and the evidence 
of them (if they leave any accessible written record at all) is in orders 
and various party filings—usually of district courts—that never get 
enshrined in published reports. 
In a recent article,6 I sought to address one key question about 
compliance negotiations: what is the endgame? That is, if the judge 
 
 5. Admittedly, there are a few specific case studies of individual agency initiatives 
that shed light on compliance negotiations. See generally MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. 
ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: 
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 89–132 (expanded ed. 1994) 
(describing EPA rulemaking under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 
ROSEMARY O’LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE EPA 
23–46, 95–116 (1993) (detailing instances of EPA rulemaking under the Clean Water and 
Clean Air Acts); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judge Lamberth’s Reign of Terror at the 
Department of Interior, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 235 (2004) (describing the challenge to Interior 
Department management of Native American trust accounts); David C. Vladeck, 
Unreasonable Delay, Unreasonable Intervention: The Battle to Force Regulation of 
Ethylene Oxide, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 191 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) 
(reviewing OSHA rulemaking related to ethylene oxide). It should also be noted that, 
although the question of remedies in administrative law has long been neglected, there has 
been a welcome proliferation of scholarship on the question very recently, albeit focused 
on what remedies to grant in the first place, not how to obtain compliance with remedies 
that have been granted. See generally Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in 
Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253 (2017) (contending that courts should use 
context-specific remedies instead of invalidating agency actions automatically); Samuel L. 
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 
(2017) (advocating against the use of nationwide injunctions to restrain the enforcement of 
administrative action); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1065 (2018) (defending the use of nationwide injunctions in at least some cases); 
Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the 
Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017) (discussing the scope of a district court’s power 
to issue a nationwide injunction and outlining situations when such an injunction might be 
appropriate); Joshua Revesz, Voluntary Remands: A Critical Reassessment, 70 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 361 (2018) (arguing that courts should be much more reluctant to grant voluntary 
remands); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017) 
(exploring when courts issue nationwide injunctions and when such relief is appropriate); 
Christopher J. Walker, Response, Against Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 106 (2017) (suggesting that the ordinary remand rule currently 
in place is preferable to a more context-specific remedial approach); Christopher J. 
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (2014) (exploring how the ordinary remand rule works in 
practice and the degree to which it promotes the separation of powers doctrine it was 
meant to uphold). 
 6. Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental 
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685 (2018). 
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refuses to credit the agency’s assertion that resource limitations or 
technical-knowledge deficiencies make compliance infeasible and 
slack necessary, what happens? Can the judge make the agency 
swallow its objections and forge ahead? In litigation against private 
parties, the answer would be yes: the judge can find a disobedient 
defendant in contempt and impose sanctions of fines or imprisonment 
to force action.7 But does contempt work against federal agencies? 
Because there is very little appellate doctrine on this point, my 
research team and I conducted broad searches of the Westlaw 
database for relevant judicial opinions, including especially those of 
district courts, and of the Bloomberg Law database for relevant 
dockets.8 We located about eighty suits in which a federal agency was 
held in contempt, plus another 150 judicial opinions with discussion of 
interest, plus over one thousand other dockets in which a contempt 
motion against an agency was made but denied. From this source 
base, my conclusion was that contempt mostly does work against 
federal agencies, but in a different way than it works against private 
defendants. Judges certainly do issue contempt findings against 
agencies—as they do against private defendants—but sanctions 
against agencies involve far greater legal and prudential 
complications than against private defendants. Several judges think 
they can impose sanctions on agencies and have tried to do so, but the 
higher courts have demonstrated near-complete unwillingness to 
allow sanctions, even as they bend over backward to avoid making 
pronouncements that sanctions are categorically unavailable against 
the government.9 Crucially, however, contempt findings in 
themselves—despite the judiciary’s evident unwillingness to couple 
them with sanctions—have a shaming effect on agency officials and 
their counsel that gives them very substantial, if imperfect, deterrent 
power.10 A finding of contempt is damaging to the reputations of 
federal agencies and officials, and the historical norm has been for 
them to work hard to avoid such a finding.11 
Whereas my previous article focuses on extreme cases in which 
litigation reaches a finding of contempt, this Essay aims to explore the 
more common and ordinary compliance negotiations that occur in the 
 
 7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §	401 (2012) (codifying the contempt power of the federal 
courts).  
 8. For a complete description of the research, see generally Appendix: Methodology 
for Locating Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685 app. (2018), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/685appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E99-TVZA]. 
 9. Parrillo, supra note 6, at 704–64.  
 10. Id. at 770–89.  
 11. Id. 
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shadow of a judge’s power to threaten contempt. I draw upon orders, 
briefs, and other filings from the assembly of suits that my team and I 
previously collected for the article on contempt, but this time focus 
more on the suits in which a contempt finding was sought by the 
plaintiff and/or considered by the judge but not actually made.12 This 
is the result in a large majority of cases. Admittedly, a full 
examination of the subject of compliance negotiations would have to 
take account of court-party and interparty interactions that are never 
recorded in filings—a kind of research that would likely require 
interviews with practitioners, litigants, and judges. That is a worthy 
endeavor for future research. For now, I believe there is much to be 
learned from the large cache of documentary sources that my team 
and I examined. 
Drawing upon those sources, this Essay provides an initial 
exploration of how compliance negotiations work. A major theme, on 
which I focus, is the judge’s access to information. By threatening a 
contempt finding with its attendant reputational damage, a judge 
knows that she can cause agency officials to act even though they say 
they lack the technical knowledge or resources to do so. But should 
the judge do this? This largely turns on what she knows. How does 
the court tell the difference between an agency whose delay is a 
 
 12. Specifically, this Essay is largely based on a body of approximately 1400 docket 
sheets in the Bloomberg Law database of U.S. district court actions from about 1990 to 
2015. In each of these actions, a plaintiff moved for contempt against a federal agency, or a 
contempt proceeding was initiated by the judge, but no contempt finding was ultimately 
made. On the process by which this body of approximately 1400 docket sheets was 
originally assembled for the earlier article, see Appendix: Methodology for Locating Cases, 
supra note 8, at 5–10 (describing two major searches of the Bloomberg Law database, 
resulting respectively in 440 and 997 docket sheets involving contempt proceedings against 
the federal government, which together—minus the small number in which contempt 
findings were actually made—comprise the body of cases examined for the present Essay). 
For this Essay, my research assistants went over the approximately 1400 docket sheets to 
find those in which the possibility of contempt received serious attention from the agency 
and/or the judge. They focused especially on those in which the judge asked for, or the 
agency furnished, new information about the agency’s compliance, or efforts at 
compliance, or in which the judge and agency communicated about timelines or deadlines 
for compliance. For cases involving such attention, the research assistants forwarded to me 
PDFs of the filings most relevant to the compliance issues. While the Bloomberg Law 
database has PDFs of virtually all filings going back to about 2005, it has PDFs for only 
some filings going back to about 2000, and almost none from before 2000. Therefore, the 
research assistants were able to find and forward PDFs only for cases from about 2000 to 
2015. Ultimately, they forwarded to me PDFs from approximately 200 docket sheets, all of 
which I examined. (In the course of the research, I decided not to include in my analysis 
suits by federal inmates because I believe such suits usually present a distinct set of issues; 
midway through the research, I asked the research assistants to stop forwarding filings 
from such cases. This exclusion did not apply to civil immigration detainees.) 
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reasonable reaction to technical-knowledge deficiencies or resource 
limitations, on the one hand, and an agency that is unreasonably lazy, 
inefficient, or politically recalcitrant, on the other? This judgment 
requires knowing something about (1) the agency’s internal 
management and capacities, (2) the many tasks competing for the 
agency’s attention, (3) the political pressures that bear upon the 
agency, and (4) the level of technical knowledge that is requisite for 
the agency to make sound decisions. For the most part, these are not 
the types of information that judges are traditionally suited to acquire 
and process.13 Indeed, they are even different from the types of 
information that judges must process when they engage in a “hard 
look” review of the merits of a technical agency decision.14 Types (1), 
(2), and (3) are in the nature of organizational and political 
information—less analogous to the paradigm of hard look review and 
more analogous to the paradigm of “structural reform litigation” that 
is more familiar in the history of civil rights suits against states and 
localities than in federal administrative law.15 And while type (4) is 
 
 13. Cf. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT 388 (1983) (arguing that measures to increase the technical and scientific 
expertise of judges are “misguided” because “what the courts need most is a better 
understanding of administrative issues, not technical ones,” mainly because better 
administrative understanding would lead to more efficacious remedies). For a discussion 
on the peculiar nature of the information necessary to decide a challenge to federal agency 
inaction, see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §	12.3, at	1068–
69 (5th ed. 2010) (“[I]n deciding whether to grant relief [for agency delay] a court must 
focus not on the detail of the agency’s method of proceeding with respect to the particular 
matter, but rather on a broad assessment of the temporal urgency of that matter in 
comparison with the temporal urgency of the scores, hundreds, or even thousands of other 
matters for which the agency has decisionmaking responsibility. .	.	. It is often easy to paint 
a picture of apparent irresponsible delay by focusing only on the manner in which an 
agency has handled a particular matter. It is much more difficult to demonstrate that delay 
of a particular matter is ‘unreasonable’ when the inquiry focuses instead on the agency’s 
total workload and its scarce resources available to accomplish all of the important tasks it 
has been assigned.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 15. For some major treatments of structural reform litigation from diverse 
perspectives, see generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL 
POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S 
PRISONS (1998) (exploring the courts’ role in reforming the prison system and arguing that 
the modern administrative state requires an active judiciary); ROSS SANDLER & DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN 
GOVERNMENT (2003) (arguing for limits on the availability, scope, and duration of 
judicial decrees against the government); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (explaining the nature, 
importance, and risks of structural reform litigation); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. 
Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 617 (2003) (arguing that judges have succeeded as policymakers and that judicial 
policymaking is subject to effective self-imposed restraints); Charles F. Sabel & William 
97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019) 
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related to technical knowledge, it really goes to the metaquestion of 
when the acquisition of knowledge ceases to be cost justified, which is 
not purely a technical inquiry but also a prudential and managerial 
one.16 
This Essay explores several aspects of the judge’s informational 
challenge. Part I explains that litigation over compliance is a world 
apart from garden-variety judicial review of agency action in that 
judges in garden-variety suits are accustomed to relying upon the 
record compiled by the agency itself, whereas in compliance disputes 
the court itself often needs to find facts in the first instance. And 
while discovery against the agency is a possibility for extreme cases, 
courts much more typically employ methods that fall short of full-
blown adversary testing, such as sworn statements submitted by 
officials on a formally voluntary basis or required status reports. Part 
II analyzes a typical example of an official’s sworn statement 
explaining the agency’s noncompliance. Usually the official can satisfy 
the judge with a facially plausible description of the agency’s 
operations and challenges, even if the official asks the judge to take 
much on faith. Given that these sworn statements and status reports 
are the judge’s usual sources of information, Part III asks how judges 
practically decide whether an agency is making sufficient efforts or 
must be forced to do more. The methods that judges use in this 
inquiry are often fairly crude, for example, demanding that the 
agency keep up its current pace of work without interrogating 
whether that pace is unreasonably slow to begin with, or using as a 
benchmark the agency’s time to complete some prior action without 
much inquiry into whether the present action is comparable. Crude as 
they are, these methods may be the best courts can devise. Part IV 
explains that judges—knowing they are dependent on officials for 
information about what efforts agencies are making and whether they 
practically could do more—consider it crucial that officials act and 
communicate in good faith. Thus, what most disturbs judges—and 
 
H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1016 (2004) (describing a trend toward experimentalist approaches in public 
litigation and reframing such litigation as involving “destabilization rights”); Margo 
Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court 
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) (suggesting that court orders governing prison and 
jail conditions have not decreased and offering suggestions for further research); and 
David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional 
Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015 (2004) (exploring the ways in which institutional reform 
lawsuits spread uniform practices across the country). 
 16. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 1355, 1389–91 (2016). 
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what most reliably spurs them to attack the agency with threats like 
contempt—is if the agency appears to manipulate information in a 
way that is opportunistic or misleading. Agencies that give this 
appearance, even inadvertently, need to win back the judge’s trust. To 
do so, they may need to increase their transparency beyond ordinary 
expectations. Finally, Part V considers how courts’ more aggressive 
and unusual means of gathering facts about agency compliance 
efforts, such as allowing top officials to be deposed or forcing them to 
attend judicial proceedings in person, can serve not only to inform the 
court but also to get the attention of the agency’s top management, 
acting as a quasi sanction akin to a contempt threat. 
I.  HOW JUDGES GET INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCY COMPLIANCE 
EFFORTS 
At the outset, we must recognize that litigation over an agency’s 
failure to comply with an affirmative court order—consisting of 
motions to modify the order, to enforce the judgment, for contempt, 
etc.—fits uneasily with judges’ usual approach to getting information 
when reviewing federal agencies. In this part, I review the usual 
approach judges use to gather information from agencies in cases 
involving the judicial review of agency action and explain why this 
particular kind of litigation fits awkwardly into that usual approach. 
A “general rule of administrative law,” known as the “record 
rule,” says that “a court can engage in judicial review of an agency 
action based only on consideration of the record amassed at the 
agency.”17 The “record” that an agency amasses regarding its own 
action (assuming the action did not result from a formal proceeding 
that produces an obvious record) consists of “all materials considered 
by responsible agency staff members,”18 which the agency assembles 
and certifies to the court.19 If the record produced by the agency is 
 
 17. PIERCE, supra note 13, §	11.6, at 1047. 
 18. Michael Asimow & Yoav Dotan, Open and Closed Judicial Review of Agency 
Action: The Conflicting U.S. and Israeli Approaches, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 521, 527 (2016). 
Asimow and Dotan are referring to informal adjudications rather than informal 
rulemakings, see id., but their language is an apt statement of the thinking for both kinds 
of action, see Daniel J. Rohlf, Avoiding the ‘Bare Record’: Safeguarding Meaningful 
Judicial Review of Federal Agency Action, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575, 583 (2009) (stating 
that, for all types of informal action, “a complete administrative record includes 
information that was directly or indirectly considered by the relevant agency,” even if the 
information did not actually pass before the eyes of the agency’s final decisionmaking 
official). 
 19. Exactly what materials the agency should include in the record and forward to the 
court in the case of informal action—particularly when large numbers of personnel and 
amounts of material are involved—is a question that is often unclear in the case law, 
97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019) 
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insufficient for the court to conduct a meaningful review, the 
appropriate course is for the matter to “be remanded to the agency to 
reconsider the case.”20 It is not for the court to inquire de novo into 
how the agency made its decision. “The focal point for judicial review 
[of agency action] should be the administrative record already in 
existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing 
court.”21 Because the agency record is “virtually the sole evidence a 
court will consider,” “plaintiffs in almost all cases cannot take 
advantage of traditional discovery tools to seek additional documents 
or information, including the testimony of officials involved in the 
decision at issue.”22 To be sure, the case law has recognized 
circumstances in which a court can allow the agency record to be 
completed or supplemented,23 including if the challengers make “a 
strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” on the part of the 
agency.24 When new evidence is allowed, the court can obtain it by 
“allow[ing] discovery by plaintiffs” or by directly “order[ing] agencies 
to add materials to the record.”25 But these circumstances are 
 
disputed in litigation, and subject to numerous judgment calls that depend on practices 
that vary by agency and are sometimes quite ad hoc (e.g., whether or when officials’ 
personal notes should be included). See Rohlf, supra note 18, at 582–602; see also Asimow 
& Dotan, supra note 18, at 529–31; Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative 
Records and the Courts, 67 KAN. L. REV. 1, 8–14 (2018); James N. Saul, Comment, Overly 
Restrictive Administrative Records and the Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 ENVTL. L. 
1301, 1311–14 (2008). To a large degree, agencies are on their honor. See Rohlf, supra note 
18, at 602–08. Some but not all of the confusion over the boundaries of the record arises 
from questions about the deliberative process privilege (though material subject to this 
privilege should arguably be placed within the record but then withheld while being noted 
in an index). Gavoor & Platt, supra, at 35–39 (noting a circuit split on whether deliberative 
process material is part of the record to begin with); see also Rohlf, supra note 18, at 584, 
591–97; Saul, supra, at 1323–29. On the EPA’s internal policy regarding what goes in the 
record, see Carrie Wehling, EPA’s Administrative Records Guidance, ADMIN. & REG. L. 
NEWS, Summer 2017, at 16, 16. The Administrative Conference of the United States 
recently adopted a recommendation regarding compilation of records for informal 
rulemaking. Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013–4: The Administrative 
Record in Informal Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,352, 41,358–59 (July 10, 2013); see also 
LELAND E. BECK, AGENCY PRACTICES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
RECORDS IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING 80–82 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/Agency%20Practices%20and%20Judicial%20Review%20of%20Adminis
trative%20Records%20in%20Informal%20Rulemaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3G9-JLD5] 
(outlining recommendations for compiling records based on a survey of agency practices). 
 20. Asimow & Dotan, supra note 18, at 533. 
 21. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)). 
 22. Rohlf, supra note 18, at 578. 
 23. Id. at 587–91; Saul, supra note 19, at 1319–23. 
 24. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), abrogated 
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 25. Rohlf, supra note 18, at 586. 
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exceptional; courts “typically reject” any attempt to introduce 
evidence beyond the record submitted by the agency.26 
With this background in mind, the unique challenges of litigation 
over agency compliance are evident. Such litigation is, to a large 
degree, a fact-gathering exercise, and potentially a daunting one. If 
the agency is claiming that its noncompliance is excusable or that it 
deserves more slack, the court may want to find out what progress the 
agency has made toward compliance, what resources the agency has 
allocated to compliance, whether those resources could be used more 
efficiently, what other priorities are competing for those resources, 
how much additional agency effort would increase the soundness of 
the decision, whether the agency has ulterior (e.g., political) motives 
for noncompliance, and what the consequences of delay are for the 
challengers and the public. The documents potentially relevant to 
these inquiries range widely; they are potentially more diverse and 
dispersed than those that would relate to a discrete agency 
rulemaking or adjudication. Further, the most relevant information 
might not be documentary at all but instead lie in officials’ unwritten 
deliberations on, for example, how to staff various projects. 
Faced with these fact-gathering challenges, the court may find 
there is no agency record at all, or at least not an adequate one. 
Though the point is not very clearly articulated in the case law, a few 
commentators have briefly noted that challenges to agency inaction 
exist in a world apart from the record rule.27 When the agency has not 
acted, there often is no agency record, or if there is a record (e.g., if 
the agency seriously considered taking action but then demurred), it 
is often incomplete.28 In these situations the court may end up doing 
fact gathering of its own since it may seem futile to remand to the 
agency to compile or complete a record of the agency’s own 
inaction.29 Postjudgment noncompliance is a type of inaction, and, as 
we shall see, it is not unusual for courts in that context to gather facts 
 
 26. Asimow & Dotan, supra note 18, at 534; see also Rohlf, supra note 18, at 585. 
 27. See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Administrative 
Cases: Developments, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 201, 239–42, 242 n.156 (1989); Steven Stark & 
Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in Review of 
Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 350–51 (1984); Debmallo Shayon Ghosh, 
Note, “Inquiries That We Are Ill-Equipped to Judge”: Factfinding in Appellate Court 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1269, 1282–83 (2015) (noting that, 
especially in cases of agency inaction, the court has no record to examine and so must look 
to other circumstances and facts). 
 28. See Sargentich, supra note 27, at 239–42, 242 n.156; Stark & Wald, supra note 27, 
at 350–51; Ghosh, supra note 27, at 1282–83. 
 29. Sargentich, supra note 27, at 239–42, 242 n.156; Stark & Wald, supra note 27, at 
350–51, 353–54; Ghosh, supra note 27, at 1282–83. 
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beyond any record submitted by the agency. This can go as far as 
allowing discovery30 but it can also be something less formal, such as 
the judge ordering periodic status reports or the agency submitting 
declarations from officials on a formally voluntary basis. 
But while first-instance fact gathering and even discovery can 
occur in compliance litigation, fact gathering against the federal 
government nonetheless remains a comparatively exceptional and 
unfamiliar enterprise for federal judges.31 That may well color judges’ 
sense of how aggressive they ought to be in doing it. And even if a 
federal agency is subjected to discovery, there are formal limits on it 
that the federal government uniquely enjoys, most notably the 
deliberative process privilege that protects communications among 
federal officials about how to make decisions—a privilege not 
enjoyed by state or local government litigants in federal court.32 While 
judges evaluating compliance by federal agencies face a task similar 
to structural reform litigation against state or local entities, they do 
not have the same visibility into the institutions they are trying to 
influence. 
II.  HOW AGENCIES PRESENT FACTS TO EXCUSE THEIR 
NONCOMPLIANCE: AN EXAMPLE 
With this context in mind, we can now consider the kinds of facts 
that an agency presents to a judge about its compliance efforts in the 
 
 30. Discovery in a challenge to inaction can be made without any prior showing about 
bad faith, see, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 5, at 199 & n.24 (describing discovery in the 1981 
challenge to OSHA’s inaction in regulating ethylene oxide), although one can find cases in 
which discovery is allowed only after a showing of bad faith, see, e.g., Tummino v. Von 
Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 230–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 31. I should qualify this by acknowledging that litigation to redress unlawful official 
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) or under Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is not confined to 
an administrative record in the way judicial review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”) model normally is. But FTCA and Bivens suits serve a distinct function: they 
are largely confined to careless or rogue behavior by lower-level officials, as distinct from 
the more policy-laden judgments that are made by agencies as institutions. These policy-
laden judgments are the province of APA-type review, which is the focus of this Essay. 
The distinct function of the FTCA is evident from its exception for “discretionary” 
functions. See 28 U.S.C. §	2680(a) (2012); PIERCE, supra note 13, §	19.4, at 1818–41. The 
distinct function of Bivens is evident from the Supreme Court’s vehement refusal to allow 
it to be used to challenge agency policy formulation. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 
1859–61 (2017). 
 32. See 2 DAVID M. GREENWALD, ROBERT R. STAUFER & ERIN R. SCHRANTZ, 
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES §	9:13, at 612–13 (2012 ed. 2012). On the increasing 
importance of this privilege, see Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the Way of Judicial 
Review: Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
349, 393–96 (2009). 
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hope of getting its noncompliance excused. For a sense of these kinds 
of facts, take an example from an environmentalists’ suit under the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) had listed five plant species as threatened or endangered 
but determined that it was “not prudent” to make the otherwise-
required designations of critical habitat for those species.33 
Environmentalists challenged these determinations, and a district 
judge found them unlawful.34 Questions then arose as to (1) how long 
the agency should have to reconsider the determinations and (2) in 
the event the agency found designations to be prudent (which was 
likely), how long it should have to actually make the designations.35 
For these tasks, the agency asked for sixteen and twelve months, 
respectively, while the plaintiffs asked for two and four.36 The judge 
roughly split the difference with only brief discussion of agency 
capacities, granting the agency nine months to reconsider the 
determinations and eight months to make the designations, should it 
find them prudent.37 After the agency departed from its earlier 
determinations and did indeed find it prudent to designate habitats, 
its eight months to make the designations began ticking down. With 
one week left on the clock, the agency rushed back to court, 
announced it would not meet the deadline, and asked for an 
extension of another eight months.38 The agency said the delay was 
due mainly to its decision to acquiesce in the recent opinion of 
another circuit calling for more elaborate methods of economic 
analysis, plus some unexpected information arising from public 
comments on the proposed designations.39 Plaintiff opposed the eight-
month extension request but said it was okay to let the agency have 
another three months.40 It moved for contempt, seeking a tighter 
injunction in the interim that would operate much like a series of 
 
 33. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Voluntary 
Remand at 3–4, Cal. Native Plant Soc’y v. Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP (S.D. Cal. May 
1, 2001), ECF No. 27.  
 34. Id. at 4–5. 
 35. See id. at 6–8. 
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. Id. at 6–8. 
 38. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Partially Amend Order 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) at 2, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 41. 
 39. Second Declaration of Gary Frazer at 2–5, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF 
No. 42. 
 40. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Amend Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt at 1, Berg, No. 3:00-
cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 44. 
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instantaneous critical-habitat designations.41 In response, the agency 
said it could speed things up; it projected it could meet the three-
month timeline, though it opposed a tighter injunction.42 
In opposing the contempt motion and defending its lateness, the 
agency submitted a declaration from Gary Frazer, the FWS’s 
Assistant Director for Endangered Species, explaining that the 
agency was going as fast as a court could reasonably ask.43 The agency 
had not been ordered to submit this declaration, nor had any 
discovery been allowed. But it was in the agency’s best interest to 
submit the document to ward off a contempt finding for missing the 
deadline. It is worth examining excerpts from this declaration as an 
example of how an agency presents itself as doing triage between 
competing legal mandates and balancing speed with decisional 
soundness: 
The Service has struggled in recent years to complete listing 
and critical habitat actions within statutorily prescribed time 
frames, consistent with the procedural requirements of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), while laboring under continued budget 
shortfalls. .	.	. The Service’s priorities for completing ESA 
Section 4 listing activities are now most often set by Court 
order. .	.	. 
The Service recognizes that the deadline for the plants’ 
designations has elapsed, and that the Service has requested an 
extension of the deadline .	.	.	. Therefore, the Service has 
undertaken extraordinary efforts to expedite completion of the 
final designation for these plants. .	.	. 
The [Carlsbad Fish and Wildlife Office (“CFWO)”] was able to 
review, categorize, and analyze all of the public comment letters 
received during the second comment period [on the 
designations], draft responses to all 120 public comment letters 
received during both comment periods, and complete the rule 
[designating critical habitat] within three weeks. The CFWO 
completed this process nine to ten weeks earlier than originally 
estimated by reassigning a number of ongoing projects within 
the CFWO, and by recruiting help from senior staff within 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt at 1, 10, Berg, No. 
3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 50. 
 43. Third Declaration of Gary Frazer ¶	2, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 
50. 
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CFWO, the Washington, DC office, and economic consultants 
to respond to public comments. This assistance cut into the 
supervisory duties of the senior staff biologist as well as the 
time he has had to devote to coordinating and writing several 
other rules with imminent court-ordered deadlines. This re-
direction of duties has resulted in internal delays for completing 
these other rules. Further, both primary staff and the senior 
staff were required to put in a significant number of overtime 
hours to complete this task. The Service did not arrive at the 
decision to reassign workloads easily, because the extraordinary 
time and effort devoted to this rule has compromised the 
Service’s ability to meet other listing rules, and may result in 
the Service seeking additional time to complete other court-
ordered deadlines. .	.	. 
Finally, to expedite the review process at Regional and 
National levels, the rule is being reviewed simultaneously at 
several levels [i.e., the field office, regional office, and DC 
office]. .	.	. The Service estimates that [simultaneous review] .	.	. 
trimmed approximately 2 ½ months off of the review process. It 
is normally not advisable nor practical to review rulemakings in 
this manner; the review process is made more cumbersome and 
difficult, it is more expensive, and by expediting the review 
process for the plants, internal review of several other rules 
were delayed.44 
This declaration is granular enough to support a facially plausible 
claim that the FWS is moving as fast as it reasonably can, though it 
still asks the judge to accept many agency judgments on faith. The 
relevant tradeoffs are all identified in a qualitative way, but while 
elements of a few of the tradeoffs are quantified (e.g., “trimmed 
approximately 2 ½ months”), most are not (e.g., “several other rules,” 
“significant number of overtime hours,” “may result in the Service 
seeking additional time”). And, of course, none of the assertions and 
prudential judgments in the declaration were subject to adversary 
examination that might have forced the agency to flesh out its 
thinking; the judge had not allowed depositions or scheduled live-
hearing testimony. This moderate level of bureaucratic self-disclosure 
was apparently enough to satisfy the judge.45 
 
 44. Id. ¶¶	2, 5, 8–9 (citations omitted). 
 45. The judge had scheduled hearings on the extension request and on contempt near 
the end of the three-month proposed extension period. He then held both motions moot 
when the FWS did, in fact, get the rule out within three months. See Order Denying As 
Moot Defendants’ Motion to Partially Amend Order and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for 
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III.  JUDGES’ TOOLS FOR GAUGING WHAT THEY CAN REASONABLY 
DEMAND OF AGENCIES 
Given this informational base (i.e., voluntary declarations and 
status reports, with a possibility of discovery), judges evaluating 
agency compliance have to decide what level of bureaucratic effort 
they think is required. In compliance proceedings, we see a good deal 
of dialogue and disputation over whether the agency is adhering to its 
promised rate of progress toward completion of the ordered task. But 
it is much less clear how or whether judges are deciding what rate of 
progress is reasonable to begin with. 
For many tasks that courts order agencies to complete, progress 
can be easily measured, or, at least, the task can be defined in a way 
that allows measurement. At the outset, the court will order the 
agency to keep to some kind of schedule, which it often bases on a 
proposal from the agency. If the overall task is comprised of a large 
number of small acts that each require approximately the same effort 
(e.g., a class of claims to decide or a mass of pages to process under 
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)), the court can issue an 
order, or simply set an expectation, that the agency will complete 
these acts at a certain rate, to be checked by periodic status reports. 
In this way, the court can tell if the agency is slowing down, in which 
case it may demand that the agency either get back on pace or explain 
itself.46 Though this method can pose problems—for example, if the 
small individual acts are not actually uniform in the level of effort 
required47—it is often workable. 
And even if the outputs of an administrative process are not easy 
to measure, the inputs may be.48 If the agency has been devoting a 
 
Contempt at 5–6, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 54. Were he upset about the 
disobedience, he easily could have scheduled an earlier contempt hearing. 
 46. This is what happened in a class action challenging the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs’ processing of Agent Orange disability benefit claims. Nehmer v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, 2007 WL 1795707, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. 
June 19, 2007); Order Re CLL Claims Procedure at 1–2, Nehmer, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, 
ECF No. 404. In FOIA litigation, page-per-time-period schedules are common. See, e.g., 
Order at 3, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:12-cv-00333-GK 
(D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2012), ECF No. 25. 
 47. See, e.g., January 2003 Status Report at 2, Loudner v. United States, No. 4:94-cv-
04294-LLP (D.S.D. Jan. 2, 2003), ECF No. 245 (noting that, in the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs’ processing of applications for distributions from the Mississippi Sioux Judgment 
Fund, the last set of applications were “single cases” that did “not allow the batch 
processing by family groups” like previous ones, slowing the pace). 
 48. Performance Measurement Challenges and Strategies, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET 
(June 18, 2003), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/performance/challenges_
strategies.html [https://perma.cc/N28R-BD85]; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, 
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certain level of staffing or funding to compliance, the judge can 
monitor that and, if it diminishes, press the agency to restore it.49 
Relatedly, judges discussing an agency’s appropriations may say that, 
if the agency’s funding is increasing, its speed should as well.50 While 
input-focused approaches to administration can be criticized for 
ignoring whether inputs produce bang for the buck, they are better 
than nothing. 
Of course, an agency action subject to a court order may not 
break down naturally into a large number of relatively uniform small 
acts—for example, a complex rulemaking. But a rulemaking can be 
broken down into a series of unique steps, each with a mini-deadline 
attached, and the judge can monitor whether the agency is meeting 
each mini-deadline. A court may tell an agency to do a rulemaking 
and then, when compliance problems arise, impose a deadline for 
completion of the whole task, plus mini-deadlines along the way, 
along with more frequent progress reports.51 
But really, all these judicial maneuvers beg further questions. A 
judge can tell if an agency is falling short of its promised or historical 
monthly rate of progress, but how does the judge know if that rate is 
reasonable to begin with? A judge who decides the agency should 
complete a rulemaking in X months can subdivide that time period 
into the various steps of rulemaking, but how does the judge know if 
X is a reasonable number of months in the first place? In my research 
I do not see judges interrogating these questions very aggressively. 
Rather, I see judges adopt a monthly claims-processing rate or a 
rulemaking time span based on the agency’s historical practice,52 or 
 
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 154–71 
(1989). 
 49. See, e.g., Amended Order at 2, Loudner, No. 4:94-cv-04294-LLP, ECF No. 241 
(criticizing the agency for having no plan to replace an employee working on the ordered 
task who is leaving).  
 50. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, Civil Action No. 00–2996 (GK), 2004 WL 
6243361, at *4 & n.5 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2004) (finding, conditional on the matter being 
remanded to the district court, that it is warranted to move from a nondeadline order to a 
deadline order for a rulemaking in part because the agency’s appropriation for such 
activity has increased); Amended Order at 2, Loudner, No. 4:94-cv-04294-LLP, ECF No. 
241 (warning agency managers they are “not far” from a contempt proceeding and 
criticizing them for not allocating the increased resources they enjoy to the ordered task). 
 51. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife, 2004 WL 6243361, at *5; Order at 3, Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. Norton, No. 4:01-cv-00409-DCB (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2003), ECF No. 121.  
 52. This is what happened in the Nehmer litigation cited above. See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text. The historical baseline may take the form of a periodic rate of 
adjudications completed, as in Nehmer, Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 
3:86-cv-06160-TEH, 2007 WL 1795707, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2007), or an amount of 
time per adjudication, as in Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, C.A. No. 09–125 
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the agency’s own proposal,53 or by splitting the difference between the 
agency’s proposal and that of the challengers,54 or by making 
comparisons to prior court orders involving the same general type of 
agency proceeding—with little attention to whether the prior 
proceedings are practically comparable to the one at bar, or whether 
the prior orders were optimal.55 
In other words, judges often make no attempt to optimize; they 
satisfice.56 They seek not the best answer but merely an acceptable 
one. Rather than directly analyze the agency’s organizational 
capacities and competing priorities to pinpoint some reasonable level 
of performance, they pick a performance level in a more or less 
arbitrary manner, like those described above. If that arbitrarily 
chosen performance level does not seem obviously unreasonable, the 
judge adopts it and gets the agency to stick with it unless a plausible 
argument arises for not doing so. 
This approach has its problems. For the judge to rely upon the 
agency’s proposal may introduce pro-agency bias. For the judge to 
split the difference may risk an order that is likewise biased toward 
the agency, or, conversely, overly stringent on the agency, potentially 
with perverse results—not to mention that splitting the difference 
invites both parties to be strategic in their proposals. For the judge to 
rely upon a historical baseline is workable only if the ordered task is 
comparable to something the agency has done in the past. There may 
not be a comparable past action, or at least, not one the parties agree 
to be comparable. 
One might argue that the satisficing approach, with all its 
problems, is inevitable given the limits of judicial competence and of 
 
Erie, 2012 WL 994641, at *6–7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2012) (construing a prior order to 
require the Forest Service to process drilling proposals at a speed equal to a historical 
baseline but holding that the challengers had not yet shown the agency’s current activity to 
be below that baseline). 
 53. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
 54. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 35–37. 
 55. In ordering FWS to designate a critical habitat for four species of fairy shrimp and 
eleven species of vernal pool plants, a court concluded that “the six-month extension 
proposed by plaintiff is more than reasonable” in part because “other district courts have 
imposed deadlines far less generous.” Memorandum and Order at 16, Butte Envtl. 
Council v. White, No. 2:00-cv-00797-WBS-GGH (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2002), ECF No. 73. 
To this point, the court cited other cases that imposed shorter deadlines but pertained to 
apparently unrelated species with no discussion of whether the time and effort necessary 
to designate critical habitat for those other species would be comparable. Id. at 16–17. 
 56. On the concept of satisficing, see HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE 
BEHAVIOR 118–20 (4th ed. 1997). 
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the resources judges have to process information. It is often said that 
courts should be reticent to question agencies on the technical or 
scientific merits of an action, given that expertise on such matters is 
concentrated in the agency, not the court.57 Information is probably 
even more concentrated in the agency when the topic is the agency’s 
own internal organizational capabilities. Still, the agency does not 
have a total monopoly, and a judge can at least occasionally find 
alternative sources of information to serve as a basis for questioning 
the agency’s assertions about what it can feasibly do. 
One source consists of formal officials who have exited the 
“revolving door” from agency employment to extragovernmental 
advocacy. Consider a suit by environmentalists during the Reagan 
Administration to force the EPA to complete several rulemakings on 
emissions of nitrogen oxides. The EPA claimed it needed four years, 
submitting a declaration from the head of its Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards saying the time was necessary given the 
complexity of the task.58 Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from David 
Hawkins, who, during the Carter Administration, had been Assistant 
Administrator for Air, Noise, and Radiation (i.e., the position directly 
above that held by the government’s declarant).59 Hawkins cited 
rulemakings from his own tenure that took far less than four years yet 
were, he said, of comparable complexity to the ones at issue.60 The 
judge was persuaded, relying heavily on Hawkins’s declaration in 
rejecting the EPA’s four-year proposal in favor of two years.61 
Hawkins was not merely a credible witness on the science of air 
quality; he was a credible witness on the EPA’s organizational 
capacity to deal with various levels of complexity within the science of 
air quality.62 He was an expert not only in the EPA’s subject matter 
but on the EPA as an institution. That said, I have not found other 
 
 57. See, e.g., Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 895 F.3d 90, 100–01 
(D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 58. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 172 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 172–75. The agency did complete the rulemaking in time. Emily Hammond 
Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1770 
(2011). The rule was then challenged on the grounds that it was insufficiently reasoned, 
held unlawful, and remanded without vacatur. Id. at 1770–71. The EPA then failed to fix 
the problems with the rule brought out by the second challenge for another fifteen years. 
Id. at 1771–72. 
 62. See Sierra Club, 658 F. Supp. at 172. 
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examples of onetime officials popping up to question their former 
agencies’ assertions about what is doable.63 
Further, the question of what an agency can do depends not only 
on hard-to-discern organizational capacities but also on the level of 
resistance it can expect from various stakeholders—a factor that may 
be even more obscure to judicial eyes. Consider a suit by 
environmentalists claiming that operators of equestrian campgrounds 
in the Shawnee National Forest were required to seek permits from, 
and submit to regulation by, the U.S. Forest Service (“USFS” or 
“Forest Service”). The court enjoined the USFS to complete review 
of pending permit applications within a certain time period.64 But 
some operators were doubtful that the law required them to apply for 
permits and, depending on how the negotiation of permit terms 
worked out, might opt to continue to do business without permits, 
presumably inviting enforcement and litigation.65 Faced with this 
delicate situation, the USFS took longer than expected to process the 
applications. When plaintiffs grew impatient and moved for 
contempt, the agency—while contending that it was compliant with 
the injunction rightly read66—admitted that “[t]he delay in permit 
issuance is regrettable”67 and that “[t]he Forest Service has 
encountered unexpected hurdles in permit processing, and it has 
taken extra time to overcome them.”68 The USFS said it felt the need 
to proceed deliberately in a manner that would get stakeholders to 
accept regulation: 
The Forest Service has struggled to maintain a positive 
relationship with anxious equestrian campground operators 
who have never before been subject to this type of regulation 
.	.	.	. Determining which campgrounds require a permit and 
under what terms required careful planning and forethought, 
given the potential for further litigation. Under these unusual 
circumstances, permit issuance was more than a ministerial 
act.69 
 
 63. That such declarations, if offered, would often be from former political appointees 
of a prior administration of the political party opposing the one in power might diminish 
their credibility. 
 64. Order and Injunction at 2, Glisson v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG 
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003), ECF No. 63. 
 65. See Federal Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff-Intervenor Wallace’s Motion for 
Contempt and Sanctions at 8–14, Glisson, No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG, ECF No. 78. 
 66. Id. at 3–4, 3 n.3. 
 67. Id. at 16. 
 68. Id. at 14. 
 69. Id. at 12. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019) 
2019] COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS 919 
One might interpret the agency’s approach as evidence that it was 
captured by the operators (as indeed the plaintiffs did),70 but 
alternatively, one might view it as a sensible means for a resource-
limited agency to induce regulated parties to engage in voluntary 
compliance with the permitting scheme and avoid the costs of 
adversary enforcement or litigation,71 or even the cost of 
congressional retaliation.72 Ultimately the judge denied the plaintiff’s 
motion for contempt,73 saying the officials faced a “difficult situation 
and had probably done as good a job as they could have done under 
the circumstances.”74 Admittedly, it is unusual for an agency to 
invoke stakeholder resistance so explicitly as the USFS did here, but 
such considerations must inform any realistic understanding of what 
an agency can practically do. And yet it is not clear how a court can 
second-guess an agency’s assessment of a matter like this. 
IV.  THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE COURT’S TRUST IN 
THE AGENCY 
We have seen that in compliance litigation the court is dependent 
on the government in a couple of ways. First, judges’ usual means of 
obtaining information about the agency’s progress and capabilities 
consist of declarations or status reports from agency officials without 
adversary testing built-in as it would be in a deposition or live 
testimony. Second, judges’ sometimes-crude methods of gauging what 
the agency can do often depend on the agency’s own proposal, either 
 
 70. Id. at 13–14 (noting plaintiff’s allegation that campgrounds “have unduly 
influenced the Forest Service”). 
 71. See id. at 11 (“The Forest Service has sought to maintain an amicable business 
relationship with the applicants and in good faith has recently met with them on a monthly 
basis to hear their concerns. The Forest Service is hopeful that most, if not all, applicants 
will quickly sign their permits. However, since some equestrian campgrounds do not 
believe that their operation requires a special use permit, the Forest Service is also 
determined to respond to equestrian campground outfitters who may ultimately refuse to 
sign a permit.” (citations omitted)); id. at 13 (“The Forest Service has patiently dealt with 
the hesitant equestrian campground operators to alleviate their concerns and is ready to 
respond if permits are not signed.”). 
 72. The agency suggested this obliquely by mentioning communications from 
Representative John Shimkus regarding “the permits that were sent to the campgrounds.” 
Id. at 11 n.13. Representative Shimkus’s district includes much of Shawnee National 
Forest. See Our District, CONGRESSMAN JOHN SHIMKUS, https://shimkus.house.gov/
about/our-district [https://perma.cc/Y2FK-JY82]. 
 73. Minutes of Court at 1, Glisson, No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG, ECF No. 86. 
 74. Federal Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Motion for Contempt and 
Sanctions at 4, Glisson, No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG, ECF No. 131 (alterations in original) 
(internal citation omitted) (quoting judge’s oral remarks from a prior hearing). 
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as the sole basis for a compliance schedule or as one half of a 
difference-splitting exercise. 
Given these dependencies, judges consider it crucial that they be 
able to trust the agency, both to convey truthfully the organizational 
realities inside the bureaucracy and to make a good faith effort at 
compliance. This is especially true if the challengers have accused the 
agency of bad faith (i.e., political resistance to obeying the order). In 
that case, the agency’s trustworthiness is the very crux of the 
litigation. 
In light of this, judges react very badly if they suspect the agency 
is engaged in bad-faith noncompliance or is misleading them about 
compliance efforts. Conversely, agency lawyers are well advised to 
provide information in a manner that projects the agency’s good faith: 
be candid about the agency’s efforts to comply and its progress 
toward compliance, anticipate when those efforts may come up short 
and warn the court early, and be explicit about any noncompliance 
that does occur and provide a transparent description and explanation 
of it to head off any inference of bad faith or political recalcitrance. 
A striking example of an agency not heeding this advice, 
resulting in a judicial eruption, is a lawsuit in the District of Montana 
by environmentalists against the USFS, claiming that the agency’s use 
of chemical fire retardant violated the National Environmental Policy 
Act (“NEPA”) and the ESA. District Judge Donald Molloy held that 
NEPA and the ESA were both applicable to the USFS’s general 
policies regarding the use of fire retardant, and he enjoined the 
agency to comply with both statutes accordingly, including an 
obligation to engage in formal consultation regarding endangered 
species with the FWS.75 The USFS asked for thirty months to comply, 
but Judge Molloy said eighteen was enough.76 In doing so, he candidly 
recognized the inexactness of any given time frame and admitted the 
eighteen-month schedule might have to be adjusted; he just wanted 
the agency to keep the parties informed and allow reasonable time for 
renegotiation.77 Addressing agency counsel, he said: 
I don’t think .	.	. 30 months is a reasonable time. .	.	. I’m going to 
require that there be NEPA compliance within 18 months of 
 
 75. Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 
1257 (D. Mont. 2005). 
 76. Docket Entry 100, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM 
(“USFS requests 30 months; Court will require NEPA compliance within 18 months of 
today’s date.”). 
 77. See Order at 2, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM, 
ECF No. 130. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019) 
2019] COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS 921 
today’s date. Now, I’ll do that with the caveat that so long as 
there is some warning ahead of time, if, at a year [from now] or 
whatever is the appropriate time, you don’t think you’re going 
to be able to hit the target, you give notice to the plaintiffs. My 
suggestion would be that before you ask for more time, you 
discuss it with the plaintiffs and the interveners. And if there’s a 
way that can be resolved without the Court involving itself, 
then I am happy to accept whatever you agree on. But I think 
you can get it done in 18 months. And if you are going to come 
in with a controversy, I hope it’s not at 17 months and 29 days.78 
As it turned out, the agency did find itself unable to meet the 
deadline and did ask for more time—exactly seventeen months and 
twenty-nine days later.79 Because the failure to meet the deadline was 
announced suddenly and inadequately explained, Judge Molloy 
suspected political recalcitrance.80 He granted a two-month extension, 
but he also scheduled a contempt hearing in the event that the agency 
was, in the judge’s words, “prevented from following the law by its 
political masters” and thus missed the extended deadline.81 “[I]t 
seems as if the government is playing a not too funny game, betting 
that the Court will be forced to grant the additional time and hoping 
the irony of the timing will be overlooked,” he wrote.82 Having been 
granted the extension, the agency then got itself in further trouble by 
missing the extended deadline.83 The day after missing that deadline, 
it issued a hasty finding that no Environmental Impact Statement was 
required under NEPA.84 The finding included an unusual disclaimer 
that the USFS’s still-incomplete consultations with the FWS might 
alter the finding in the future.85 Judge Molloy then scheduled a 
 
 78. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting judge’s oral remarks from a prior hearing). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 3. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 2. 
 83. See FSEEE’s Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Contempt at 1, Forest Serv. 
Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 139 (noting “the Forest 
Service .	.	. failed to complete either an environmental impact statement or a finding of no 
significant impact (FONSI) by the Court’s deadline, in violation of NEPA’s required 
form”). 
 84. Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Contempt at 5–6, Forest Serv. Emps. for 
Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 137; see also FSEEE’s Reply Brief in 
Support of Its Motion for Contempt at 2, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-
00165-OWM, ECF No. 139 (describing the Forest Service’s filing as “hastily-prepared” 
and “signed .	.	. a day after the Court’s deadline for compliance”). 
 85. Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Contempt at 5–6 & nn.2–3, Forest Serv. 
Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 137. On the fact that such 
disclaimers are unusual in such a finding, see Transcript of Hearing on Motion for 
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contempt hearing, which he said would give the agency “the 
opportunity to dispel the Court’s inclination to hold it in contempt of 
court.”86 As a shot across the bow, he told the agency to brief the 
question of whether its top official, Undersecretary of Agriculture 
Mark Rey, should be incarcerated for contempt.87 
From this low point, the agency recovered. Eight days prior to 
the contempt hearing, the USFS issued a revised (and much longer) 
finding that no Environmental Impact Statement was required, 
having at last completed consultation with the FWS.88 The revised 
finding adopted new precautions in the use of fire retardants that the 
FWS was now recommending.89 At the contempt hearing itself, the 
USFS and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) took the 
extraordinary step of bringing Undersecretary Rey and five U.S. 
Department of Agriculture career officials to Missoula, Montana, to 
testify for two afternoons, explaining in extreme detail the internal 
bureaucratic bungling that led to the big delay. “We take the gravity 
of your last order to heart,” the DOJ attorney told Judge Molloy, 
“and we’re basically an open file today and throughout the remainder 
of these proceedings.”90 The USFS-FWS consultation, said the 
witnesses, had been so drawn out because of miscommunication and 
misunderstanding between the two agencies regarding the fire 
retardant program, which caused them to grossly underestimate how 
many species had to be evaluated.91 In such an operation, the role of a 
 
Contempt at 59, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review). I had this transcript produced using a grant from 
Yale Law School’s Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund. The hearing was held February 26–27, 
2008, and is noted in two docket entries, ECF Nos. 155 and 156. 
 86. Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 
1135 (D. Mont. 2008). 
 87. Id. at 1136. 
 88. See Defendant’s Notice of Completion of Consultation and Further Decision 
Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact at 1, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 
9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 150 (describing the revision of the initial finding and filing 
the revised version with the court); ABIGAIL KIMBALL, U.S. FOREST SERV., DECISION 
NOTICE & FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: AERIAL APPLICATION OF FIRE 
RETARDANT 2 (2008), https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/ media_wysiwyg/wcfs_
aerial_application_of_fire_retardant.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7AX-6BR4] (noting the 
differences between the initial and revised findings). 
 89. KIMBALL, supra note 88, at 2–3. 
 90. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Contempt at 10, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. 
Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM. 
 91. See id. at 52–53, 63, 84–86, 88, 94, 100 (recording testimony that describes the 
misunderstanding); id. at 19, 32, 37, 88 (recording testimony noting particularly the 
agencies’ inaccurate initial understanding of the scope of the work). One witness admitted 
that the USFS inadvertently failed to give the FWS certain information it needed. Id. at 
151–52. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019) 
2019] COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS 923 
high official like Rey was to ensure that officials who actually 
formulated findings and decisions had the resources they needed, and 
all officials testified that they received all the resources they 
requested and were never discouraged from complying with the law.92 
The agency’s ultimate compliance and its openness about its 
mistakes mollified Judge Molloy. He acknowledged that 
Undersecretary Rey was “not in charge of the day-to-day activities of 
what goes on.”93 Further, he seemed to concede that his initial 
attribution of politicized bad faith to the agency had been wrong, 
though he made the important point that the agency invited this 
attribution because of its initial failure to be forthcoming with 
information about compliance problems: 
THE COURT: I have been doing this [i.e., judging] for 12 
years, and I know the difficulties that your agencies have. I do 
feel you may not think that, but I do understand that. 
And I think that if the rule of law is to abide by what we all 
want it to be, I have to follow the law, I have to rely on the 
lawyers to tell me, when I say, “look, I think that’s too much 
time, but I understand there might be some problems. Just 
don’t come in here at the last minute on the last day and tell me 
there’s a problem. Give us a heads-up.” 
And that didn’t happen. And— 
THE WITNESS [UNDERSECRETARY REY]: And for that, 
we apologize. 
THE COURT: .	.	. [W]ell, maybe you should talk to your 
lawyers and tell them that if you’re having those kinds of 
difficulties, information really helps. I mean, if we practice in the 
dark, then we maybe draw conclusions that are not warranted. 
But I anticipated that there might be some of these problems. It 
was why I said [at the initial hearing on the compliance 
schedule]: “Look, if you’re having problems, let me know about 
it.” 
And I didn’t get any word until, ironically, when I said, “don’t 
come in here on .	.	. the 17 months and 29 days,” and that’s 
exactly when [the extension request] came in, was almost like, 
 
 92. See id. at 81, 120 (recording testimony indicating that the agency provided all the 
requested resources necessary for compliance); id. at 34, 62–63, 75, 94, 110, 121 (recording 
testimony by agency officials that they did not discourage compliance and by agency 
employees that they were not discouraged from complying). 
 93. Id. at 227. 
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you know, it was—one could read it to have been more than 
ironic.94 
In other cases, too, we observe the importance of government 
lawyers disclosing information in a manner that projects agency good 
faith. In a major class action suit against the Interior Department for 
mismanaging Native American trust accounts, Judge Royce 
Lamberth had an extraordinary series of confrontations with the 
government, holding contempt trials of two successive Interior 
Secretaries in 1998 and 2002 and finding them both liable. The 
troubles began when the government failed to comply with certain 
discovery orders because of problems in the agency’s information-
management system, problems that, Judge Lamberth believed, the 
agency concealed from the court.95 In a challenge to the Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs’ processing of claims related to Agent Orange, 
the government initially made itself vulnerable to similar trouble 
when it failed to explain a slowdown in the processing rate, leading 
the judge to suspect bad faith and issue a show-cause order.96 The 
government then recovered by pinpointing the reason for the 
slowdown (a miscommunication between headquarters and a field 
office about how many employees the latter was to assign to 
processing), reporting it in detail to the court, and volunteering to be 
subjected to more fine-grained reporting requirements going forward 
about the rate of processing and the resources devoted thereto.97 
Again, transparency is the currency of good faith, as the Department 
of Veterans Affairs was able to avoid a contempt finding.98 
 
 94. Id. at 37–38 (emphasis added). At the end of the hearing, Judge Molloy said he 
believed all the witnesses were sincere, but he criticized the agency, its personnel, and its 
lawyers for their level of competence and for not taking responsibility. Id. at 226, 229. 
 95. This is noted in the order and opinion at the end of the first contempt trial. Cobell 
v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 1999). For the second contempt finding, see Cobell 
v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002), rev’d, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The D.C. 
Circuit later removed Judge Lamberth from the case on the ground that he had become so 
biased against the government that he could no longer be impartial—a remarkable finding 
that normally occurs only if a judge engages in “improper outside communications,” of 
which Lamberth never made any. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
 96. See Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, 2007 WL 
1795707, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2007). 
 97. Defendants’ Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause Why Defendants 
Should Not Be Held in Contempt at 10–12, Nehmer, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, ECF No. 
408. 
 98. See Order Vacating Hearing and Status Conference and Discharging the Order to 
Show Cause, Nehmer, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, ECF No. 442. Another example of how 
agencies benefit from being transparent can be seen in a suit against the Department of 
Defense (“DOD”) for unlawful inoculations of service members against anthrax. The case 
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V.  INFORMATION GATHERING AS A QUASI SANCTION TO GET THE 
AGENCY’S ATTENTION 
So far, we have focused on information as the basis for courts’ 
decisions about what to order the agency to do. Once the court has 
decided the agency should do a certain thing, the official “stick” to 
incentivize the agency to do that thing is the threat of a contempt 
finding, with its attendant reputational damage. It is the contempt 
threat, often directed at the head of the agency, that grabs the 
attention of that official and, therefore, of the official’s subordinates. 
But information gathering itself can serve a purpose similar to 
that of contempt, operating unofficially as a quasi sanction—an 
unpleasant thing that grabs the attention of officials. For example, 
reporting requirements, if they become frequent and burdensome 
enough, can serve this purpose. In one instance, a court made an 
agency report to the plaintiff on its progress every day for an eight-
month period.99 Another example is the appointment of a special 
master, which, though rare against federal defendants,100 can make 
officials’ lives much more difficult, taking away their autonomy and 
privacy. 
Perhaps the most striking example is a judicial attempt to allow a 
high agency official to be deposed or to force such an official to testify 
in court. Any high official is busy, and having to testify is disruptive 
because of the time necessary to attend the deposition or court 
proceeding, to travel (if it is a court proceeding outside Washington, 
D.C.), and, most importantly, to prepare—the official almost certainly 
knows nothing about the case except perhaps short briefings, so 
 
resulted in a worldwide injunction against the inoculations, which had been given at the 
rate of thousands per day. Defendant’s Response to Order to Show Cause at 4–6, John 
Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:03-cv-00707-EGS (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2005), ECF No. 69; see also 
Lee Black, Informed Consent in the Military: The Anthrax Vaccination Case, 9 VIRTUAL 
MENTOR 698, 700–01 (2007) (recounting the history of the vaccination program and the 
resulting case). Upon learning that some inoculations had occurred after the injunction 
had issued, the DOD rapidly disclosed this fact. Response to the Court’s Minute Order at 
1–3, John Doe #1, No. 1:03-cv-00707-EGS, ECF No. 65. When the court nonetheless issued 
an order to show cause, the DOD gave a detailed narrative (based on two declarations and 
several exhibits from the director of the Military Vaccine Agency) of how it had 
communicated the court’s order to all parts of the military, how it was tracking any 
inoculations that still occurred, and what it was doing to stop them (plus plans to send 
letters of apology to all persons erroneously inoculated). Defendant’s Response to Order 
to Show Cause at 4–22, John Doe #1, No. 1:03-cv-00707-EGS, ECF No. 69. 
 99. Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
100 F.3d 837, 839, 841 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting the trial court’s action). 
 100. See, e.g., Trentadue v. CIA, No. 2:08–CV–0788, 2015 WL 1968263, at *5 (D. Utah 
Apr. 30, 2015) (appointing a special master to monitor agency noncompliance). 
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getting up to speed takes hours or days. And there is the risk of 
embarrassment and adverse consequences if the official, questioned 
by the challenger or judge, is caught saying something ignorant or 
makes some unwarranted concession. Given all this, the threat of 
being deposed or made to appear in court can be an effective 
attention-getting device. The effect may be to get the high official to 
do what is within his or her power to appease the judge into backing 
off, such as allocating more agency resources to the court-ordered 
task. At the same time, the threat has incentive effects on the lower-
level officials and attorneys who have more direct involvement with 
compliance: they do not want to be the ones held responsible for 
subjecting the boss to inconvenience and embarrassment. 
But while making high officials testify might be effective in 
getting the agency’s attention, appellate courts have been extremely 
averse to the idea (just as they are averse to contempt sanctions). The 
prudential concern is obvious: such demands for testimony, if 
multiplied, could rapidly take up huge amounts of high officials’ time, 
crippling agency management.101 Further, appellate judges have a 
ready theory for why high officials need not testify. The conceit of 
demanding such testimony is that the court needs information from 
the target official, but high officials usually do not know much about 
compliance with any particular court order, so there is almost always 
some lower-level official who could give better information.102 In 
recent decades, the federal courts of appeals have repeatedly granted 
writs of mandamus to stop district courts from allowing depositions 
of, or subpoenas to, high federal agency officials.103 Indeed, my 
 
 101. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d 1368, 1373–74 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 102. See, e.g., In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that plaintiffs 
had “shown no need” to depose the Vice President’s Chief of Staff when there was a 
lower-level official that could be deposed and that was “more logically suited to clearing 
up the lingering questions regarding” the information plaintiffs sought). 
 103. In re McCarthy, 636 F. App’x 142, 142 (4th Cir. 2015) (granting a writ of 
mandamus to block the deposition of the EPA Administrator); Order, In re United States, 
No. 14-5146, 2014 BL 398967 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2014) (granting a writ of mandamus to 
block the deposition of the USDA Secretary); In re United States, 542 F. App’x. 944, 949 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting a writ of mandamus to block the deposition of the Federal 
Reserve Chair); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d at 314 (granting a writ of mandamus to block the 
deposition of Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff while allowing depositions of lower-
level staffers); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 316 (8th Cir. 1999) (granting a writ of 
mandamus to block subpoenas directing the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney 
General to testify); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1057, 1062–63 (5th Cir. 1995) (granting a writ 
of mandamus to block the deposition of three board members of the FDIC); In re United 
States, 985 F.2d 510, 511, 513 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (granting a writ of mandamus 
to block a subpoena directing the FDA Commissioner to testify for a half-hour by phone). 
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research turns up no court of appeals case that denies such a petition 
for mandamus. 
A good illustration of how district judges may come near to 
making high officials testify only to be reversed upstairs is Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States,104 a challenge by a Florida 
Native American tribe and environmentalists to the EPA’s failure to 
stop Florida from backing off its plan to protect the Everglades 
(particularly from phosphorus pollution by the sugar industry) under 
the Clean Water Act.105 In the 1990s, Florida sought and obtained 
EPA approval for a delay of its Clean Water Act plans, promising to 
bring phosphorus in the Everglades down to its natural level by an 
extended deadline of 2006.106 But between 2003 and 2005, the state, 
by legislation and state agency action, put off the date further to 
2016.107 The EPA concluded that Florida’s action did not alter water 
quality standards and therefore did not require EPA review.108 
Plaintiffs sued both the state and the EPA. In 2008, District Judge 
Alan Gold granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that 
parts of Florida’s action were unlawful and that it did require EPA 
review, consistent with his opinion.109 The EPA then took no action 
for fifteen months.110 On plaintiffs’ motion, Judge Gold issued a show-
cause order,111 which prompted the EPA to quickly conduct a review 
and disapprove some aspects of Florida’s action.112 But Judge Gold 
found that the EPA’s disapproval did not go far enough and that it 
contravened his prior ruling about what Florida needed to do.113 
Given the ongoing injury to the Everglades, as well as the EPA’s 
delayed and inadequate response, Judge Gold imposed a new, more 
specific injunction on the EPA to review Florida’s plans yet again 
with a five-month deadline.114 He also ordered EPA Administrator 
Lisa Jackson to “personally appear” in his courtroom on a set date six 
months hence, “to report to the Court on compliance with this 
 
 104. 706 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 105. Miccosukee Tribe, 2008 WL 2967654, at *1–2. For an excellent discussion of the 
background and origins of the case, see generally Dexter Filkins, Swamped: Jeb Bush’s 
Fight Over the Everglades, NEW YORKER, Jan. 4, 2016, at 32.  
 106. Miccosukee Tribe, 2008 WL 2967654, at *11. 
 107. Id. at *14–16. 
 108. Id. at *1. 
 109. Id. at *42–43. 
 110. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 
1305 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 111. Order to Show Cause, Miccosukee Tribe, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ, ECF No. 358. 
 112. Miccosukee Tribe, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–06. 
 113. Id. at 1305. 
 114. Id. at 1323–25. 
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Order.”115 The EPA did meet the five-month deadline, and then 
moved to have the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Water, 
Peter Silva, who was one rung below Jackson, appear at the upcoming 
compliance hearing instead of Jackson.116 
Judge Gold refused, insisting he had “a right to pose direct 
questions” to Jackson “regarding whether the [water protection] 
strategies outlined” in the EPA’s recent review of Florida’s plans “are 
a sincere commitment or merely an empty shell,”117 especially given 
the major increases in funding that would be necessary to fulfill those 
plans,118 presumably from both state and federal coffers. It seems 
Judge Gold was not interested in technical or scientific information 
about water quality but in questions about the political willingness of 
the EPA to allocate and lobby for billions of dollars in funding—a 
sufficiently high-level question about which the Administrator 
arguably was an appropriate person to testify. Clearly, though, the 
order to testify was not purely informational in purpose: it was an 
effort, after years of agency resistance, to force the Everglades into a 
higher place on EPA management’s agenda and perhaps to put the 
Administrator in a box where she had to make some public 
commitment to the Everglades’ preservation. 
The government then sought a writ of mandamus from the 
Eleventh Circuit, which stayed Jackson’s appearance and then within 
weeks issued an opinion granting the writ.119 Judge William Pryor, 
writing for a two-to-one majority, framed the question strictly in 
terms of technical informational needs.120 The question was whether 
the EPA’s review of Florida’s Clean Water Act compliance plan was 
lawful, and Assistant Administrator Silva—not Administrator 
Jackson—was the person officially responsible for the review’s 
preparation.121 This made Silva “the most knowledgeable official” 
 
 115. Id. at 1324. 
 116. Docket Entry 460, Miccosukee Tribe, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ. 
 117. Miccosukee Tribe, 2010 WL 3860712, at *4, mandamus granted sub nom. In re 
United States, 624 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 118. See id. (noting that the “protection of the Everglades is of considerable national 
importance,” finding that the case presented “extraordinary circumstances” necessitating 
the “Administrator’s attendance at the hearing,” and citing to a previous order describing 
the financial implications of compliance); see also Sua Sponte Order of the Court at 2, 
Miccosukee Tribe, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ, ECF No. 470 (projecting compliance costs in 
the billions of dollars and describing the EPA’s need for a “meaningful financing plan”). 
 119. In re United States, 624 F.3d 1368, 1372, 1377 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 120. See id. at 1373. 
 121. Id. 
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about the agency action at issue and negated any need for Jackson to 
testify instead.122 
In dissent, Judge Beverly Martin, a former district judge, argued 
that the case met the high standard for calling a high official to testify 
because of “the extensive disobedience displayed by the EPA.”123 In 
her view, the district court’s maneuver should be evaluated not in 
light of its need for scientific or technical information but in light of 
its need for compliance after a long period of resistance.124 The forced 
appearance was less a matter of information gathering than 
enforcement: “[f]aced with such recalcitrance, the [district] court 
properly relied upon the long recognized inherent authority of district 
courts to enforce their mandates.”125 
Martin’s view, conceiving of the forced appearance more as an 
enforcement weapon than an informational device, was rejected by 
the majority. The EPA’s “alleged noncompliance” was simply 
irrelevant to the permissibility of calling the Administrator to testify: 
“[o]ur decision is not about that issue,” the majority wrote.126 If the 
district judge meant to force the Everglades into a higher place on the 
EPA’s agenda, that was wrong. It was improper for a judge to seek 
“to determine the priorities for a high-level executive official,” an act 
that “clearly encroached on the discretion vested in the executive 
branch.”127 “[I]t cannot be said that the Everglades is the only matter 
of national importance demanding the Administrator’s attention.”128 
Appellate courts’ willingness to shield high officials from a 
demand to testify—exemplified by cases like Miccosukee Tribe—may 
suggest that this is not an effective weapon. But the truth is more 
nuanced. For one thing, the EPA did offer up Assistant 
Administrator Peter Silva to testify in Miccosukee Tribe.129 Silva was 
still quite a high-ranking official—Senate confirmed, with a vast 
jurisdiction.130 The appellate opinions blocking high-official testimony 
generally pertain to agency heads,131 and it is not clear how frequently 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1380 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 1379. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1376 (majority opinion). 
 127. Id. at 1375. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1371. 
 130. Id. Silva did participate in the compliance hearing when it eventually happened—
the day after breaking his wrist!—though, by then, Judge Gold had converted it to a 
conference call, and Silva said little. Oral Argument at 81–84, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 
of Fla. v. United States, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF No. 545. 
 131. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
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officials below that rank but still with substantial agenda-setting 
power are subject to these demands.132 
Agency heads themselves do not always escape demands to 
testify. Though the DOJ seems to be universally successful when it 
seeks mandamus on this issue, it is also famously restrained in going 
to the courts of appeals, and there are some striking cases in which it 
did not try to get a court of appeals to block high-official testimony. 
One was the contempt trial of Interior Secretary Gale Norton in the 
Native American trust account litigation in 2002, in which Norton 
took the stand for three-and-a-half hours, repeatedly answering “I 
don’t know” to questions from the plaintiffs’ attorney about the trust 
accounts.133 Another was the litigation on USFS use of fire retardants 
discussed above, in which Agriculture Undersecretary Rey traveled to 
Missoula, Montana, for two days to testify before Judge Molloy, 
saying “[w]e’re sorry” for the mistakes that led to his agency’s delay 
and “we dropped the ball.”134 Besides Rey, testifying must also have 
been burdensome and anxiety provoking for the five career officials 
who had to speak at length about their agency’s mistakes and 
miscommunications at their boss’s contempt hearing. Indeed, one 
faced a dressing down from Judge Molloy for the agency’s “systemic 
disregard of the rule of law,”135 and another was forced to say he 
could not recall why he failed to keep agency counsel and the court 
informed about the delay.136 
It is interesting to speculate on why DOJ opted against seeking 
mandamus in these cases. Within any given case, the government 
must pick its battles, especially with an angry district judge. 
Regarding the Native American trust account litigation, the Wall 
Street Journal had written, “Justice Department lawyers defending” 
 
 132. Cf. Order at 1–2, Razeq v. Gonzalez, No. 3:07-cv-02652-JZ (N.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 
2008), ECF. No. 28 (threatening to make Karyn Zarlenga, acting director of the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services Cleveland Field Office, show up at a show-cause 
hearing if action was not taken before date certain); Order at 6, Leybinsky v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., No. 4:00-cv-01314-MM (M.D. Pa. June 12, 2001), ECF No. 61 
(ordering an Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) district director and INS 
supervisory detention and deportation officer to “appear in person” at a show-cause 
hearing). 
 133. Neely Tucker, Norton Admits Some Indian Trust Records “No Longer Exist,” 
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/
02/14/norton-admits-some-indian-trust-records-no-longer-exist//f10d5af4-3db2-4833-bc47-
630b069b8005 [http://perma.cc/3M4Q-4NCY]. 
 134. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Contempt at 38, Forest Serv. Emps. for 
Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 9:03-cv-00165 (D. Mont. Feb. 26–27, 2008) (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 135. See id. at 129–31. 
 136. Id. at 200–05. 
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the Interior Department “have been treading gingerly,” as Judge 
Lamberth “has become the legal equivalent of volcanic Mount 
Pinatubo.”137 
Consistent with the idea that threats to force high-ranking 
officials to show up are credible, at least sometimes, judges view such 
threats as having incentive effects on official behavior in some 
instances. When a district court preliminarily enjoined some of the 
Obama Administration’s antideportation initiatives in 2015, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently issued 
deferred action status to a few thousand applicants in violation of the 
injunction.138 When the judge learned of this, he ordered the named-
defendant high officials (including the DHS Secretary) to attend a 
show-cause hearing in person, six weeks hence.139 Before the 
scheduled date of the hearing, the government submitted a brief 
detailing its painstaking efforts to redress the noncompliance, some of 
which had been undertaken after the court’s announcement that the 
officials would have to show up in court in person.140 After receiving 
this brief, the judge backed off his order that the high-ranking 
officials show up,141 but he later said the government “did not 
implement effective corrective measures until this Court ordered [the 
agency and its officials] to actually appear in Court to explain their 
inaction.”142 
 
 137. John J. Fialka, Babbitt and Rubin Face Fiery Judge on Native American Trust-
Fund Case, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 1999), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB917484374874372500 [http://perma.cc/QU2B-7XBJ]. By the time Norton testified in 
February 2002, Judge Lamberth had shown the ability to disrupt Interior Department 
operations in a variety of ways, including cutting off parts of the agency from the internet. 
Shane Harris, Court-Ordered Blackout Leaves Interior Employees Without Internet, E-
mail, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Dec. 14, 2001), https://www.govexec.com/technology/2001/12/court-
ordered-blackout-leaves-interior-employees-without-internet-e-mail/10678 [http://perma.cc/
UX9N-7AF3] (“Lamberth’s order .	.	. has left most Interior employees unable to use the 
Internet or send and receive e-mail to addresses outside the agency.”). 
 138. Order at 1–2, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00254 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2015), 
ECF No. 281.  
 139. Id. 
 140. See Defendants’ Expedited, Unopposed Motion to Cancel August 19 Hearing or, 
in the Alternative, to Excuse Secretary Johnson and Other Defendants and to Substitute 
Witnesses, and Memorandum in Support at 5–21, Texas, No. 1:14-cv-00254, ECF No. 287. 
The “unprecedented residential site visit program” was “initiated” on July 16, id. at 14, 
which was several days after the court’s July 7 announcement of the August 19 show-cause 
hearing, id. at 1. 
 141. Order at 1, Texas, No. 1:14-cv-00254, ECF No. 289.  
 142. Texas, 2016 WL 3211803, at *12 n.13 (emphasis added).  
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CONCLUSION 
My aims in this Essay have been to identify compliance litigation 
as an important factor determining the efficacy of judicial review of 
agency action generally, to show that the judge’s access to 
information is the defining problem for such litigation, and to explore 
how judges and litigants grapple with that problem. There is a great 
deal more fruitful work that scholars can do on this subject, 
particularly on the last of these three points. The research will need to 
draw upon sources besides the published appellate cases that are the 
traditional focus of legal scholarship. A great deal could be learned 
from unpublished orders and filings gathered purposely to analyze 
this topic (whereas the sources for this Essay, as noted earlier, were 
gathered for a related but distinct topic, i.e., contempt, and shed light 
on compliance negotiations incidentally). And yet more can be 
learned from interviews with veterans of this kind of litigation in 
order to understand aspects of the negotiations that leave no trace in 
the official court record. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
